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Weighing the risks of climate change 
Lara Buchak, UC Berkeley 
 
ABSTRACT: This essay argues that when setting climate change policy, we should 
place more weight on worse possible consequences of a policy, while still placing some 
weight on better possible consequences.  The argument proceeds by elucidating the range 
of attitudes people can take towards risk, how we must make choices for people when we 
don’t know their risk-attitudes, and the situation we are in with respect to climate policy 
and the consequences for future people.  The result is an alternative to the Precautionary 
Principle, an alternative that gives similar policy recommendations in many cases but is 
also sensitive to the costs of precautions.   
 
1. Introduction  
How should we take potential bad consequences into account when setting climate 
policy?  One possible answer is to use the Precautionary Principle.  In both its strong and weak 
form, it speaks to situations in which there is a possibility of serious environmental harm, but a 
lack of scientific certainty about the relevant cause and effect relationships.  The weaker version 
of the principle says that in these situations, lack of certainty is not a reason not to take 
precautionary measures.  The stronger version of the principle, which I will be concerned with 
here, says that lack of certainty is a reason to take precautionary measures: if we cannot rule out 
the possibility of serious harm, we must take serious measures to prevent it.1   
                                                          
1 The precise form of this principle is stated differently by different authors, and there are a number of canonical 
statements of it in public policy.  Gardiner (2006: 35) mentions the Wingspread Statement (1998), the UN 
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The strong Precautionary Principle has faced three important criticisms.  The first 
criticism is that it does not have adequate justification.  The second criticism is that it is 
imprecise, ill-defined, or vague.  The final criticism is that the Precautionary Principle tells us to 
care only about the worst-case scenario, and only a particular kind of worst-case scenario.  It 
does not take seriously the fact that all policies carry with them some risks of harm. 
This essay argues for an alternative to the Precautionary Principle, an alternative that 
gives similar policy recommendations in many cases but is also sensitive to the costs of 
precautions.  Furthermore, the alternative argued for can withstand all three criticisms.  It is 
justified by a general theory about risk-taking, along with a simple ethical argument about 
making choices that affect future individuals.  It is precise.  And it is appropriately sensitive both 
to the fact that avoiding disaster is important, and to the costs of doing so.   
I derive this alternative from a general, formal theory of decision making.  Drawing on 
previous work, I explain how individuals may reasonably adopt a fairly wide range of attitudes 
towards risk, where an attitude towards risk is understood in terms of how much weight an 
individual places on worse scenarios versus better scenarios.  Second, I argue for an important 
principle for decisions involving other people: if you don’t know someone’s risk-preferences, 
you should presume that he is inclined to place as much weight on worse scenarios as a 
                                                          
Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992), the Third North Sea Conference (1990), the Ozone Layer 
Protocol (1987), the UN Environment Program (1989), the EU’s environmental policy (1994), and the US 
President’s Council on Sustainable Development (1996).  Other statements include Principle 15 of the Rio 
Declaration (1992) and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.  See Bodansky (1991) for 
older examples of policies that presuppose the principle.  For interpretive discussions, see Sandin (1999), Sunstein 
(2005: 15-20), Gardiner (2006), Steele (2006), Gardiner (2010: 13-14), Broome (2012: 118-20), Moellendorf (2014: 
62-89), and Steel (2015). 
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reasonable person could possibly place on them—that he wouldn’t take a risk unless all 
reasonable people would take it.  Next, I explain the upshot of this principle for policy choices 
about climate change, choices that involve the well-being of future people who will deal with the 
effects of these policies.  In particular, I argue that we should adopt very risk-avoidant policies: 
policies that place significant weight on worse scenarios.  In short, we should be willing to curb 
human activity in a way that is very costly for humans in order to ameliorate the risk of climate 
disaster, even if this risk is fairly small.  Finally, I show that the principles I have argued for 
support, in many cases, recommendations that are similar to those of the strong Precautionary 
Principle, but do not fall prey to the worries mentioned above. 
 
2. There are many reasonable attitudes towards risk  
 Decision theory is the study of rational decision-making.  The kind of rationality in 
question is means-ends or instrumental rationality.  Thus, decision theory answers the question: 
if you want some consequence (‘end’), what should you do (what ‘means’ should you take) in 
order to get it?  More precisely, since decision theory concerns what to do when you are 
uncertain about the state of the world—when you are uncertain which actions lead to which 
consequences—decision theory answers the question: if you value various consequences to 
various degrees, what should you do in order to get something of higher value rather than lower 
value?  For example, if you know that you would rather have a career as a successful musician 
than a career as a successful lawyer, but you prefer both careers to being penniless, and you 
know that whatever career path you embark on may or may not be successful, should you go to 
music school or law school? 
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 The classical answer to this question is that you should maximize expected utility: where 
utility values are assigned to the possible consequences of an action and probability values to the 
possible states of the world if that action is taken, you should pick the act with the highest 
weighted average of utility, where each utility value is weighted by the probability of the state in 
which it is realized.  (Utility is a measure of how much you value consequences, and probability 
is a measure of how likely you think various states of the world are to obtain.2)  For example, 
where u(x) is the utility of consequence x, let’s say that u(successful musician) = 10, 
u(successful lawyer) = 1, and u(failed musician) = u(failed lawyer) = 0.  And where p(A □→ S) 
is the probability of state S if you were to do A,3 let’s say that p(law school □→ successful 
lawyer) = 0.99, p(law school □→ failed lawyer) = 0.01, p(music school □→ successful musician) 
= 0.1 and p(music school □→ failed musician) = 0.9.  Then the expected utility of law school is 
(0.99)(1) + (0.01)(0) = 0.99, and the expected utility of music school is (0.1)(10) + (0.9)(0) = 1, 
so you should go to music school. 
 However, I have elsewhere argued that this cannot be the whole story.4  Knowing how 
much you value various consequences and how likely they are to obtain if you take a given 
action is not enough to tell you which action you should take.  That is because we don’t yet know 
your strategy for getting what you care more about.  In particular, we don’t know how you trade 
off a high chance of ending up with something pretty good against a lower chance of ending up 
                                                          
2 We can hold that utility is determined in advance of preferences or that it is derived from preferences, and similarly 
for probability; the difference between these views won’t matter here. 
3 This is the formulation used in ‘causal’ decision theory.  The differences between causal decision theory, evidential 
decision theory, and Savage’s (1954/1972) formulation, which is used in n. 8, won’t matter here. 
4 Buchak (2013) explains and argues for all of the claims in this section in more detail. 
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with something much better.  You might think a small probability of success as a musician is 
worth forgoing the safer option, but you might instead want to play it safe and go for a nearly-
guaranteed career as a successful lawyer.  This is particularly salient when we note that you only 
have one life to live, a life in which you will either be a successful musician, a successful lawyer, 
or have a failed career. 
 Following the tradition of rank-dependent utility theory,5 I’ve argued that the missing 
ingredient is your attitude towards risk.  Specifically, I’ve proposed that instead of maximizing 
expected utility, rational individuals maximize risk-weighted expected utility: you needn’t 
weight the utility of each consequence by its probability, but instead can weight the utility of 
each consequence by a factor that depends both on its probability and on how good or bad it is 
relative to the other consequences of that action.  If you are risk-avoidant, then worse 
consequences get proportionally more weight than better ones.  For example, instead of 
weighting the best state by its probability p, you might weight the best state by a smaller value 
such as p2, assigning worse states the (larger) remainder of the weight.  In this case, the risk-
weighted expected utility (REU) of law school is (0.9801)(1) + (0.0199)(0) = 0.9801, and the 
REU of music school is (0.01)(10) + (0.99)(0) = 0.1, so law school comes out much better.  For 
the risk-avoidant individual, the utility of being a musician would have to be much higher to 
make going to music school worth the risk: law school would come out better even if the utility 
of success as a musician were 90, i.e., 9 times as large as it is.  To the extent that you are risk-
avoidant—that you place more weight on worse scenarios and less on better scenarios—a bad 
                                                          
5 Early theories in this tradition include anticipated utility (Quiggin 1982), dual theory (Yaari 1987), Choquet 
expected utility (Schmeidler 1989, Gilboa 1987), and cumulative prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 
Tversky and Kahneman 1992). 
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scenario being very bad will make a big difference in what you choose and a good scenario being 
very good will not.  Furthermore, the more risk-avoidant you are, the more it is worth it to 
accept a lower utility for better consequences in exchange for a lower probability of worse 
consequences.6  On the other hand, if you are risk-inclined, then better consequences get 
proportionally more weight than worse ones—in this case, music school might come out much 
better, and it might come out better even if the utility of being a musician were not much greater 
than that of being a lawyer.   
We can represent the difference between EU-maximization and REU-maximization 
graphically.  For clarity, we will use an example of an action with several possible 
consequences.7  Consider the action of taking a job at a fledgling start-up.  If the start-up is 
amazingly successful (probability 0.01) then you will be very wealthy, feel a strong sense of 
personal accomplishment, have a short and pleasant workday, and be able to travel the world and 
enjoy the finer things in life (utility 7).  If it is very successful (probability 0.29) then you will be 
fairly wealthy, feel accomplished, and have an enjoyable workday (utility 6).  If it is moderately 
successful (probably 0.5), then you will have enough money to pay the bills, but the hours will 
be long and boring (utility 4).  If it fails (probably 0.2), then you will have to leave and get an 
unpleasant, demanding job where you are merely scraping by (utility 1).  The expected utility of 
this action is represented by the shaded area in each of the graphs in Figure 1. 
                                                          
6 This follows from the fact that the more weight one places on worse consequences, the more one is willing to 
lower the utility of better consequences in order to raise the utility of worse consequences—even if the utility by 
which the better consequences are lowered is larger than the utility by which the worse consequences are raised. 
7 Example and graphs taken from Buchak (2017a) and Buchak (2017b).  Numbers in both examples in this section 
were chosen for ease of exposition. 
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Figure 1: Expected Utility 
 
These two graphs represent the same evaluation, in different ways.  The left-hand graph shows 
that the expected utility of an action is the sum of its possible utility values, each multiplied by 
the probability of obtaining exactly this value.  The right-hand graph shows that, equivalently, 
the expected utility of an action is the sum of its possible utility benefits (the amount which you 
get if you improve over the next-worst consequence, regardless of what else you get), each 
multiplied by the probability of obtaining at least this benefit. 
 Risk-weighted expected utility allows that each individual, instead of weighting each 
possible utility benefit by its probability, weights each utility benefit by a function of its 
probability.  As benefits obtain in a smaller and smaller portion of scenarios, they matter 
proportionally less and less to you if you are risk-avoidant; and proportionally more and more to 
you if you are risk-inclined.  The risk-weighted expected utility of taking a job at the start-up, for 
the risk-avoidant and risk-inclined individual, is represented by the shaded area in the graphs in 
Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Risk-Weighted Expected Utility 
 
The modification of the classical theory is therefore represented by weighting each utility benefit 
by a risk-function of its probability, rather than its bare probability, where the risk function r(p) 
represents how much weight an individual places on the top p-portion of consequences.8 
                                                          
8 The general equation for expected utility maximization (in the form represented by the right-hand graph in Figure 
1) and the general equation for risk-weighted expected utility maximization are as follows.  Where g = {E1, x1; …; 
En, xn} is an ordered gamble that yields consequence xi in event Ei and 𝑥𝑥1 ≤ ⋯ ≤ 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 (here “≤” represents the weak 
preference relation) we have: 
 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑔𝑔) =  ����𝑝𝑝(𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗)𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗=𝑖𝑖
� (𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) −  𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖−1))�𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 
𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑔𝑔) =  ��𝑟𝑟��𝑝𝑝(𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗)𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗=𝑖𝑖
� (𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) −  𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖−1))�𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 
 
with u a utility function of consequences, p a probability function of events, and r a ‘risk function’ from [0, 1] to [0, 
1], with r(0) = 0, r(1) = 1, and r non-decreasing.  Replacing p(E) with an objective probability p yields anticipated 
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From this discussion, it should be clear that risk-avoidant individuals are not only 
concerned with worst-case scenarios, but (like expected utility maximizers) with every scenario.  
For the risk-avoidant person, better scenarios make less of a difference to the value of an action, 
but all scenarios matter to some degree.  Better scenarios need to be a lot better to offset what 
happens in worse scenarios, but if they are valuable enough, they can offset the negative value in 
worse scenarios. 
Thus, rational decision-making involves three factors: a utility function, which represents 
how much you value consequences; a probability function, which represents how likely you 
think various states are to obtain; and a risk function, which represents how much the top p-
portion of outcomes matter in your decision making.  Importantly, a wide range of risk-attitudes 
are reasonable.9  There are two goals in means-ends reasoning: prudence—ensuring that worse 
scenarios aren’t that bad or that likely—and venturesomeness—ensuring that better scenarios are 
very good.  And it is up to each individual to decide how to trade off these two goals: there is no 
argument to show that it is better to make sure one’s life doesn’t go too poorly or instead that it is 
better to ensure a chance that one’s life goes extremely well. 
                                                          
utility; replacing r(p(E)) with a non-additive weighting function w(E) yields Choquet expected utility.  An individual 
is risk-avoidant if r is convex; he is risk-inclined if r is concave; and he is risk-neutral (he maximizes expected 
utility) if r is linear.  Graphs above use r(p) = p2 for the risk-avoidant individual and r(p) = p1/2 for the risk-inclined 
individual. 
9 Decision theorists sometimes distinguish between rationality—an evaluation of formal consistency—and 
reasonableness—an evaluation of substance.  Although there are risk-attitudes that are consistent while being 
unreasonable (just as there are utility and probability assignments that are consistent but unreasonable), my point 
here is that there is a wide range of risk-attitudes that are both consistent and reasonable.  
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So, there will be a very wide range of reasonable ways to trade off these goals.  In the 
above choice, it is not unreasonable to pursue music, nor is it unreasonable to pursue law.  
However, not every way of trading off these goals will be reasonable.  For example, if you have 
a 0.98 probability of succeeding as a musician and the above values, it will be unreasonable to 
pursue law—doing so would amount to being overly cautious and not venturesome enough.  
Likewise, if you have only a 0.001 probability of succeeding as a musician, it will be 
unreasonable to pursue music—doing so would amount to being overly venturesome and not 
prudent enough. 
I want to note two facts that follow from the view laid out in this section, facts that will 
be important in what follows.  The first is that even if everyone agrees on the probability and 
utility of various scenarios, there can be reasonable disagreement about how much weight to 
place on these scenarios.  Relatedly, while we might be able to argue about probabilities and 
utilities with the hopes of converging on what is rational to believe given the evidence and on 
what is in fact good, there is little hope of converging on a unique risk-attitude that we each 
endorse.   
The second important fact concerns when differences in risk-attitudes make a difference 
to actual choices and when they do not.  Differences in risk-attitudes between individuals will be 
magnified when worse scenarios are much worse than other scenarios.  Furthermore, differences 
in risk-attitudes will be magnified when a particular choice is a one-shot gamble rather than a 
repeated gamble.  To see this, note that we should not evaluate each of our choices in isolation—
rather, we should evaluate entire choice paths—and note that repeating a gamble minimizes risk.  
If you and I value money the same, and the only choice each of us faces is whether to take a 
coin-flip in which we get ten dollars if the coin lands heads and nothing if it lands tails, or 
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whether instead to take a coin-flip in which we get four dollars however the coin lands, then we 
might make different choices, depending on how each of us weight worse scenarios.  However, if 
we are each deciding whether to take a series of the one kind of coin-flip or a series of the other, 
then unless our risk attitudes diverge very wildly, we will make the same choice.  This is because 
the first series is very nearly certain to yield very close to five dollars times the number of flips, 
and the second series is certain to yield four dollars times the number of flips.  Thus, even if I 
place much more weight on, say, the worse 80% of consequences than you do, the consequences 
in the risky but repeated choice (almost certainly) fall within a very small range.  To summarize: 
when a choice involves large differences in consequences or can be thought of as a one-shot 
gamble, then differences in risk-attitudes will make a large difference to what is chosen. 
 
3. Climate change 
We turn now to the particular case of climate change policy.  We will assume that the 
primary charge of those thinking about policy in this domain—whether global policy or a 
country’s individual policy—is to be responsive to the considered, mutually disinterested 
preferences of the people in its charge.   I will assume that ‘people in its charge’ includes future 
as well as present people (at least people in the fairly near future, say, 200 years or so).  
Furthermore, I will assume that the interests of future people must be weighed as highly or 
nearly as highly as those of present people.  This inclusion of future people, and the particular 
way in which they are included, is no doubt controversial and needs serious philosophical 
defense10—but I hold that the assumptions here map roughly onto how future people should be 
                                                          
10 See discussion in Broome (2012: 142-43).  Note that the assumptions I make here imply that the interests of future 
people must be taken into account directly, rather than through the preferences of current individuals. 
12 
 
taken into account, ethically speaking.  Policies can be as fine-grained as we want, and can 
include both restrictions and adaptations to possible change.   
 Let us consider a very simple model, to give us an idea of how to apply the above 
analysis.  We are choosing between policies, where each policy has two main effects: it raises or 
lowers the probability of drastic climate change, and it has certain non-negligible negative 
consequences if climate change does not occur. For example, one policy (a ‘precautionary’ 
policy) might be to substantially limit carbon emissions and another policy (an ‘industrious’ 
policy) might be to allow any level of carbon emissions, where the first policy will carry with it a 
lower probability of drastic climate change but the second policy will have a much higher utility 
if drastic climate change does not occur, since it will allow individuals to engage in a wider 
range of industrious efforts.  We will assume that the policies have the same utility if drastic 
climate change does occur, i.e., that the negative effects of drastic climate change will negate any 
other effects of the policies.  (All of these assumptions could be relaxed, and a more accurate 
model would consider many different levels of climate change—e.g. 2-degree warming, 3-degree 
warming, 6-degree warming—and hold that a precautionary policy has lower probabilities of all 
levels of climate change than the second, but an industrious policy has higher utility at all levels 
of climate change, perhaps much higher at the least drastic levels and negligibly higher at the 
most drastic levels.  But our crude model will be enough to illustrate how to apply our analysis to 
climate change policy.) 
We will also assume that there are two relevant groups of individuals.  One is the group 
of future individuals, who bear the costs of drastic climate change if it occurs.  The other is the 
group of current individuals, who are not affected very much by drastic climate change (since it 
would occur in the future), but who still bear the costs of precautionary policies—though these 
13 
 
costs are much lower than the costs to future people of drastic climate change.  So, to illustrate, 
we might think that under an industrious policy, there is a 0.05 probability of a 6-degree increase 
in temperature,11 a consequence which has utility -10,000 for future people and -1,000 for 
present people, and a 0.95 probability of a non-noticeable increase in temperature, the 
consequence of which, if everyone is free to act without regard to emissions, has a utility of 500 
for everyone.  And we might think that the policy of limiting emissions reduces the probability 
of a 6-degree increase to 0.01, but also reduces the utility under a non-noticeable increase to 0 
for everyone.  Thus, we face the following choice: 
 
 Present People Future People 
Industrious Policy {-1,000, 0.05; 500, 0.95} {-10,000, 0.05; 500, 0.95} 
Precautionary Policy {-1,000, 0.01; 0, 0.99} {-10,000, 0.01; 0, 0.99} 
 
 Note that the preferences of the future people concerning their options will depend 
heavily on their risk-attitudes, since these options have the two features mentioned above: the 
choice concerns a single, non-repeatable event; and the worse consequences are much worse than 
the better consequences.  For example, some individuals might be willing to accept a slightly 
increased risk of climate change in exchange for the benefits of the industrious policy, whereas 
others might not.  Standard expected utility maximizers will: it makes a bigger difference that the 
top 95% of states yield a consequence with utility 500 rather than 0, than that the near bottom 
4% of states yield a consequence with utility 0 rather than -10,000.  On the other hand, if one is 
                                                          
11 This is the number suggested by the Fourth Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007). 
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fairly risk-avoidant, then the reverse holds.12  And (I’ve claimed) all of these attitudes are 
reasonable.  So the question of what to do in cases in which reasonable people could make 
different choices becomes crucial.   
 
4. Taking Risks for Future People 
We first face the question of what the future people prefer.  An obvious difficulty is that 
we do not know their preferences.  In light of this difficulty, what risk-preferences should we 
attribute to them for purposes of decision-making?  I have elsewhere argued for a principle that I 
call the Risk Principle:13 
 
Risk Principle: When making a decision for an individual, choose under the assumption that 
he has the most risk-avoidant attitude within reason unless we know that he has a different 
risk-attitude, in which case, choose using his risk-attitude.14 
 
This principle says to avoid risk, unless we know that the individual would prefer otherwise.  (I 
will talk in terms of knowledge that he prefers otherwise, but we could instead substitute consent 
                                                          
12 For example, a future person will prefer adopting the precautionary policy if his risk-preferences are represented 
by r(p) = p2.5, which corresponds to giving 2.5% of the weight to the worst 1% of consequences, giving 12% of the 
weight to the worst 5% of consequences, and giving 82% of the weight to the worst 50% of consequences (i.e., to 
caring about the bottom half of consequences nearly five times as much as the top half). 
13 See Buchak (2017b). 
14 I leave open whether one must use his risk-attitude if it is unreasonable, but that case doesn’t matter here.   
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or hypothetical consent or sufficient evidence—I don’t have a view about which of these is the 
right way to fill out the principle.)     
The basic idea is that when we make a decision for another person, we consider what no 
one could fault us for.  Assuming we don’t know an individual’s risk-attitude, then if no 
reasonable person would reject an option on the grounds that it is too risky, we are justified in 
choosing that option.  Conversely, if a reasonable person could reject it on these grounds, then 
we are not justified in choosing it.  If we do know the individual’s risk-preferences, then no one 
could fault us for using them to make a decision.   
It follows from the Risk Principle that when we use it to take a risk on behalf of another 
individual, this risk could not reasonably be rejected by him as too risky, whether or not we 
know his risk- attitudes.  More specifically, if we choose according to the Risk Principle, then 
whatever comes to pass, the individual could not reasonably complain that he would have given 
more weight to avoiding the possibility in question: either no one would reasonably give more 
weight to this, or he himself would give this exact weight. 
What is the lower bound on reasonable risk-avoidance?  More work would need to be 
done here, and I can do no more than speculate.  But to give you a rough idea of how I am 
thinking about this by putting some (very speculative) numbers on it, I think that it is not 
unreasonable to care about the bottom half of consequences five times as much as the top half,15 
but that is close to the reasonable lower limit.  This is way more risk-avoidant than most people 
are, but it still represents a healthy regard for venturesomeness.  Importantly, the strategy known 
                                                          
15 This coincides roughly with how much weight people have been found to give to the bottom half of individuals 
relative to the top half of individuals in a particular hypothetical social choice involving medical outcomes.  See 
Nord (1993).    
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as maximin, which puts all of the weight on the worst outcomes, would not count as reasonable, 
since it gives no due to venturesomeness. 
 One might worry that if we make very risk-avoidant choices on behalf of another 
individual, he could fault us for not being risk-inclined enough.  There seems to be an odd 
asymmetry, where an individual who ends up in the bad scenario can fault us for not making the 
bad scenario better, but an individual who ends up in the good scenario cannot fault us for not 
making the good scenario (even) better.  In response, I do not know why there is an asymmetry 
here, when there isn’t one obviously suggested by decision theory, but the Risk Principle seems 
to map onto our considered practices, both of decision-making for others and of reasonable 
complaint.  For example, let’s say I drive a carpool, and I discover that the seatbelts in the back 
aren’t working.  I would need to first get everyone’s permission to drive them in this vehicle, but 
I wouldn’t need to first get everyone’s permission to be late to pick them up because I was busy 
fixing the broken seatbelts—even if it turns out that everyone would have preferred riding with 
the broken seatbelts.  Risk-avoidance appears to be the default, and the choice without fault. 
 Another objection is that instead of attributing to an individual very risk-avoidant 
preferences—on the grounds that he could not reasonably complain about the consequences of a 
decision made on this basis—we should attribute to him a typical or average risk function, 
perhaps typical or average of all people or of his reference class (those with the same gender, 
nationality, age, or social class, for example).  After all, these are ways of having evidence about 
someone else’s risk-preferences, and so they are ways of answering the individual’s hypothetical 
complaint (“what justified you in taking this risk on my behalf?” “because that’s the risk I 
(reasonably) thought you’d want to take!”).    
17 
 
 I am not sure whether this way of attributing risk- attitudes is justified.  But whether it is 
or not, the Risk Principle can account for it.  To the extent that information about an individual’s 
class amounts to knowledge about his preferences (or provides hypothetical consent), the Risk 
Principle says we are justified in choosing on its basis.  And notice that if we do think that such 
information serves as a basis for choosing for another person, we will also think it provides good 
evidence about his preferences.  If we think that it does not, then that will be because we think it 
does not provide much evidence at all, or does not provide evidence that can be used to form 
justified beliefs.  Either way, the background presumption is that we cannot choose a more-than-
minimally-risky gamble for another person unless we have some reason to think that he would 
take that gamble himself: in the absence of a strong reason to do something else, we default to 
risk-avoidance. 
Compare this to a case in which you do not know someone else’s preferences about (non-
risky) consequences, as when you are choosing ice cream for a friend and you don’t know 
whether he likes chocolate or vanilla.  In this case, you are justified in choosing arbitrarily, or on 
the slimmest of bases: you know a slight majority of men prefer chocolate, or you vaguely 
remember the friend selecting vanilla once.  That you are justified in selecting on these bases is 
precisely because, in contrast to risk-preferences, there really is no default for preferences about 
consequences, and therefore no justification needed to move away from it: you have no prima 
facie reason to choose one or the other, so a weak reason of any kind will do the trick.  (It may be 
objected that there is prima facie reason to choose one or the other, on the grounds that (say) 
chocolate is more offensive to people that dislike it than vanilla is, so one should choose 
vanilla—but then this is precisely because chocolate is the risky choice, and one ought to be risk-
avoidant when choosing for another.) 
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 Again, the default is risk-avoidance: take only the risks that no one could reasonably 
reject.  To the extent that you can be justified in knowing someone else’s risk-attitude, you can 
move away from the default in making choices for someone else.  This means that you are more 
justified in making risky choices for your acquaintances than for a stranger; and it may mean that 
you are justified in making risky choices for someone to the extent that you have reliable 
information about risk- attitudes within his reference class.  But if someone is distant from you 
or you do not have reliable information about him, then you must default to risk-avoidance: you 
must weight worse scenarios as highly as one can reasonably weight them. 
To summarize, the default risk attitude is the one that gives maximal weight to worse 
possibilities, within the bounds of reason: for each p, weight the bottom p-portion of outcomes as 
much as a person could reasonably weight them.16   And we may move away from the default 
risk attitude, in making a decision that affects a single individual, just in case we know or can be 
justified in believing that he would choose to move away from the default.   
 To return to the case of group decision-making, there is a short step from the Risk 
Principle to attributing a maximally risk-avoidant attitude to those group members whose risk-
attitude are unknown, so that we can make policy decisions on the basis of these attributed 
preferences plus the known preferences of the remaining group members.  (In our case, this will 
amount to assuming that the future people prefer the precautionary policy.)  The remaining 
objection to consider is this: it is a feature of group decision-making that a smaller group is 
sometimes authorized to decide on behalf of a larger group (as when elected officials make 
                                                          
16  Formally, if R = {r(p) | r is a reasonable risk function} is the set of reasonable risk-attitudes, then the most risk-
avoidant of the reasonable risk-attitudes is  𝑟𝑟′(𝑝𝑝) =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟∈𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟(𝑝𝑝).  (We will tentatively assume that r’ itself has the 
properties of a risk function, and is convex.) 
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decisions for their constituents or a sub-committee is formed to resolve an issue), or taken to be 
representative of the larger group (as when a randomly-selected group is polled for their views 
concerning some issue).  In these cases, one does not need to directly know the preferences of 
the larger group.  So why, in our case, do we not simply take the risk-attitudes of the sub-group 
whose risk-attitudes are known, to be the appropriate ones on which to base our decision?  (If 
present people have risk-attitudes that imply they would prefer the industrious policy were they 
in the situation of the future people, then why don’t we assume the future people would also 
prefer this?) 
In response, note that when a smaller group is authorized to make decisions on behalf of 
the whole, the larger group (or an agreed-upon representative thereof) must agree to this.  In the 
case of future people, we don’t have this authorization.  Alternatively, when a smaller group is 
taken to be representative of the larger group, then it must be representative in the right way: it 
must statistically mirror the relevant features of the larger group, or we must have reason to think 
it does.  But, as I’ve argued above, since future people are distant from us, we don’t have good 
reason to think that their risk-preferences are similar to ours.  Nor can we reliably speculate 
about their risk-preferences on the basis of the risk-preferences of present individuals. 
Therefore, when thinking about climate change policy, we should make the decision as if 
future individuals are maximally risk-avoidant.  We should presume that they are willing to pay 
significant costs to reduce the risk of worse consequences, even to reduce this risk by a fairly 
small amount.  So, in our example, we must attribute to future individuals a strong preference for 
the precautionary policy. 
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What does this mean about the policy decision, given that the group affected includes 
both present and future people?  That depends on how we should aggregate the preferences of 
our entire group.   
One view is that we cannot take any risks that anyone in our group would not consent to.  
This follows from one generalization of the Risk Principle to group decision-making: in order to 
move away from the default, everyone involved must prefer to do so.  If this is the correct view, 
then the conclusion is that we must make maximally risk-avoidant policy choices. 
I’m not going to claim that this is the correct view, however.  There is something to be 
said for it, but there is also something to be said for the thought that it is too risk-avoidant, since 
it does not take the preferences of the less-risk-avoidant into account at all.  Luckily, we do not 
need such a strong view to reach the conclusion that our policy choices must be very risk-
avoidant.  For our choice has two features.  First, it is the future people who bear the costs of the 
risks—who have lower utility in worse scenarios.  Second, there are a large number of future 
people—at least as many as there are present people.  And when one subgroup is larger than 
another subgroup and is more affected by the decision than the other, the preferences of the 
former can’t be weighted less heavily than those of the latter.  Thus, the group choice can be no 
riskier than an even balance between the preferences of the present people and those of the future 
people.  
To remind the reader: if we assume risk-neutrality, then both present and future people 
will prefer the industrious policy; but as we increase risk-avoidance, future people will prefer the 
precautionary policy, and by a larger and larger margin the more we increase risk-avoidance.  If 
we assume maximal risk-avoidance for future people, then they will very strongly prefer the 
precautionary policy.  And so both the numbers of and stakes for future people mean that the 
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extent to which they prefer the precautionary policy outweighs the extent to which present 
people prefer the industrious policy, if indeed present people do prefer it. 
Thus, even though it would be reasonable to eschew the policy that limits emissions—in 
the sense that some individuals might reasonably eschew it—we are required to adopt it, since a 
reasonable but very risk-avoidant future person would adopt it.  We have to be particularly 
cautious with respect to risks faced by future people, because we don’t know whether these 
people would be willing to accept them. 
The general lesson that can be drawn from this section is this: 
 
Future Risk-Avoidance Principle: If we are making a decision whose largest effects concern 
a large group of future individuals, then we should make a very risk-avoidant choice: a 
choice which weights the worse consequences proportionally much more heavily than the 
better consequences. 
 
5. The Precautionary Principle and Future Risk Avoidance  
 Recall the (strong) Precautionary Principle, from above:  
 
Precautionary Principle: If we cannot rule out the possibility of serious environmental harm, 
then we should take precautions to prevent this harm. 
 
Although the antecedent of the principle is usually stated in terms of ‘uncertain’ cause and effect 
relationships, I take this formulation to capture the upshot of this uncertainty presumed 
important: that we cannot be sufficiently certain that environmental harm won’t occur.    
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The argument in the present essay suggests that the Precautionary Principle can be 
vindicated, to a limited extent, since it falls under the scope of the Future Risk-Avoidance 
Principle.  It follows from the Future Risk-Avoidance Principle that as long as we hold that the 
probability of some serious negative consequence is non-negligible when precautions are not 
taken and that taking precautions makes some difference to this probability (easily outweighing 
loss of best case utility), we are required to take precautions.  Furthermore, on the analysis here, 
we are required to take precautions precisely because we are in the situation described by the 
Precautionary Principle: the potential negative consequence is a serious harm and its probability 
is above some small threshold.  In addition, the analysis here gives a specific reason why the 
situation described by the Precautionary Principle has this upshot.  The negative consequence 
would affect individuals who we cannot assume would consent to the risk even given large costs 
to avoiding it—and therefore must be assumed to prefer to avoid it (even if we ourselves might 
take it).  
 Thus, the Future Risk-Avoidance Principle can recover some of the judgments that many 
apparently find intuitive.  In addition, I claim, the Risk Principle avoids some of the criticisms 
that have plagued the Precautionary Principle.  
I will discuss three major sets of criticisms of the Precautionary Principle.  First, the 
Precautionary Principle may be claimed to be unjustified, in a number of ways.  It may be 
criticized as lacking an adequate philosophical justification, for example that there is no more 
general principle that it follows from.  It also may be criticized as possessing a justification that 
is misguided.  In this vein, for example, Cass Sunstein claims that the Precautionary Principle 
arises from irrational decision-making tendencies surrounding small probabilities, specifically 
the tendency to focus on the magnitude of harms and not pay enough attention to the probability 
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of these harms.17  As evidence, he notes that people are not sensitive to risks of harms in a way 
that is proportional to the probabilities of these harms: they do not weight consequences linearly 
in probability.  He holds that the Precautionary Principle is simply a codification of our irrational 
attitudes.  Finally, the Precautionary Principle may be criticized as being incompatible with 
desiderata for decision-making that we do take to be justified.  Martin Peterson presents a result 
to show that the Precautionary Principle is jointly incompatible with several widely accepted 
principles of decision-making.18 
The Future Risk-Avoidance Principle avoids the criticism that it lacks positive 
justification.  It is grounded in a general, well-justified theory of decision-making and of risk-
taking for other individuals and for groups.  It is grounded in what we owe to future people when 
we are uncertain about what will happen: while we are allowed to a certain extent to weigh their 
interests against ours, when we think about what their interests are, we must presume that their 
risk-attitudes lie on a particular edge of reasonableness.  We must presume that they care a lot 
more about worse scenarios than better scenarios, and therefore that there need only be a small 
probability of a very bad consequence in order for them to prefer to expend a lot of resources to 
avoid that consequence.  In addition, the introduction of risk-attitudes can explain why ordinary 
decision-making tendencies need not be irrational, and so principles based on them need not be 
misguided.19  Risk-avoidant individuals—and therefore the policy recommendations arising from 
                                                          
17 Sunstein (2005: 64-88).  
18 Peterson (2006, 2007). 
19 I don’t claim that all of the documented tendencies of ordinary people are rational, just that there is reason to care 
a lot about worse scenarios, even if they are unlikely.  For example, I agree that people tend not to be good at 
estimating probabilities, and that the tendency to make different choices in response to different descriptions of a 
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the principles in this paper—are sensitive to probabilities, but not in a linear fashion.  Finally, if 
we make a very weak assumption, namely that reasonableness requires that moving probability 
from a bad consequence to a good consequence always make the resulting gamble strictly 
preferred to the original gamble, then the Future Risk-Avoidance Principle is compatible—and, 
indeed, entails—the principles Peterson mentions.20 
The second set of criticisms of the Precautionary Principle concern its imprecision.  It 
seems to make unclear recommendations.21  The circumstances in which the principle is 
supposed to apply—when there is ‘serious harm’ whose possibility ‘we cannot rule out’, for 
example22—are not adequately defined.  And even if they are adequately defined,23 then the 
principle faces a common problem for principles based on threshold concepts, namely that small 
differences in input can lead to large differences in output.  In this case, small differences in 
circumstances can lead to very different policies: if a harm is close to ‘serious’ but not quite over 
the threshold then the principle will not tell us to take precautions, but if it is just over the 
threshold then the principle will tell us to take serious precautions.  
                                                          
problem is irrational.  The probabilities that we use when we employ the Risk Principle must themselves be 
reasonable, and we must use a privileged or correct description of the outcome of a policy.  See Buchak (2013: 74-
81) for a discussion of the relationship between REU-maximization and documented behavioral deviations from 
EU-maximization. 
20 The technical form of the assumption is that r is increasing, rather than merely non-decreasing.  The satisfaction 
of the conditions in Peterson (2006, 2007) follows from REU-maximization with a strictly increasing risk function; 
see Buchak (2013: chapter 3). 
21 See Bodansky (1991: 5), Posner (2004: 140), Sunstein (2005: 26), and Gardiner (2006: 36).   
22 Or when we are ‘uncertain about the relevant cause and effect relationships’. 
23 See Sandin (1999), Resnik (2003), and Steel (2015: 27-8) for examples of precisifications of the principle. 
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The Future Risk-Avoidance Principle is precise, and makes clear recommendations.24  
Again, it is simply an application of ordinary decision-making principles.  There is no 
discontinuity between how our analysis deals with climate change and how it deals with less 
serious cases, because all cases of decision-making are subsumed under the same general rules.   
 The final criticism is that the Precautionary Principle is myopic.25  It tells us to care only 
about serious harm, and perhaps only a certain kind of harm—environmental harm, rather than 
other types of harm.  It does not take seriously the fact that all policies, including precautionary 
policies, carry with them some risks of harm.  Furthermore, these policies have costs in non-
disastrous scenarios—sometimes large, known costs—and because the Precautionary Principle 
tells us to think only about how to prevent serious harms, the Precautionary Principle is 
insensitive to the size of these costs.  
 The Future Risk-Avoidance Principle avoids this criticism, because (1) every relevant 
harm and benefit goes into determining the utility value of a consequence, and (2) risk-avoidance 
does not council us to ignore scenarios in which there is not serious harm, but simply to weight 
them proportionally less.  Although scenarios without serious harm, or with harm that is less 
serious, are weighted less by virtue of the fact that they are relatively better, if costs in these 
scenarios are high enough then we should not adopt precautionary policies.  So, the analysis here 
allows us both to acknowledge that the costs of precautionary measures can possibly outweigh 
                                                          
24 At least, if we can say roughly what constitutes the most risk-avoidant attitude within reason, which, as 
mentioned, is a question for further study.  Note that while ‘largest risks’ and ‘large group’ are imprecise notions, 
this is because the Future Risk-Avoidant Principle is a gloss on the conclusion of the more precise principles from 
the previous sections, not because it represents the limits of precision. 
25 Sunstein (2005: 26-34), Gardiner (2006: 53-54).   
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their benefits and that we ought to take them across a very wide range of costs even the 
probability of serious harm is low without them. 
 It will be helpful to contrast the Future Risk-Avoidance Principle with two other 
proposed rules for climate change policy.26  The first is Maximin, which says to choose the 
action whose worst-case scenario has the highest utility.27  Unlike the Future Risk-Avoidance 
Principle, Maximin is only senstitive to what goes on in the worst-case scenario.  Those who 
advocate using Maximin advocate using it only in certain circumstances, but problems arise for 
applying it to the case of climate change no matter what these circumstances are taken to be.  If 
these circumstances include that the utility differences between non-disastrous outcomes are 
small or unimportant, then Maximin will simply be silent when there are serious harms and 
benefits in these other scenarios. But since there are serious differences between the non-
disastrous consequences of most policy decisions, including policy decisions about climate 
change, it will not be applicable in most policy decisions.28 If we instead hold that we should use 
Maximin even when there are serious differences between consequences in non-worst scenarios, 
                                                          
26 Since all of principles in this section speak of the effects of climate change full stop, rather than the effects on 
some particular person, we must assume that there is a single evaluation of or utility assignment to each 
consequence, perhaps arrived at through aggregating the well-being of each individual. 
27 See, e.g., Hansson (1997), Gardiner (2006, 2010), McKinnon (2009), and Moellendorf (2014); much of the 
discussion in these papers cites Rawls (1974, 1999).  Maximin can be thought of either as an interpretation of the 
Precautionary Principle, or as an alternative to it.   Maximin is only a plausible rule under uncertainty, rather than 
risk, but the rule is still important to contrast with the Future Risk-Avoidance Principle, particularly since one needs 
to introduce some threshold probability for states to include in the decision problem in order to apply it.   
28 See also Sunstein (2005: 112). 
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then the rule would tell us to simply ignore these differences, so it would fall prey to the myopia 
criticism: it would tell us to ignore something that we should not ignore.29  
 The second alternative to the Precautionary Principle is Expected Utility Maximization.30  
Again, expected utility maximization in the individual case says: to figure out the expected 
utility of an action, weight the utility of each consequence by the probability of that consequence 
if that action is taken; then pick the action with the highest expected utility.  One then adds: not 
only should this principle be used for individual decision-making, it should be used for group 
decision-making of the relevant sort.  This principle is obviously sensitive to all of the costs and 
benefits of an action.  However, compared to the Future Risk-Avoidance Principle, it is too 
sensitive to what goes on in better scenarios, especially the very best scenarios.  (That its 
recommendations are very different from those of the Precautionary Principle tell us that it does 
not track intuitions very closely, although of course its proponents could argue that that’s no 
mark against it.)  If I am right about the correct theory of rational decision-making, then expected 
                                                          
29 See Steele (2006: 27); see also my criticisms of Rawls’s difference principle in Buchak (2017b). Another 
principle for decision-making (also plausible only under conditions of uncertainty) is Minimax Regret. Minimax 
Regret says to choose the action that has the smallest maximum regret, where the ‘regret’ of an action A in each 
state is defined as the value difference between the highest-valued action in that state and the value of A in that state.  
See Chisholm and Clarke (1993), Hansson (1997), and Steel (2015) for discussion of this principle in this context of 
climate ethics.  A criticism similar to the above can be leveled against Minimax Regret: if the rule only applies when 
there is serious regret in only one scenario, then it will not be applicable to most decisions; and if it applies more 
generally, it tells us to completely ignore all possible regrets except the most serious regret, which we should not 
ignore. 
30 EU-maximization has many defenders. For an extended defense in the particular case of climate ethics, see 
Broome (2012). 
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utility maximization is actually under-motivated in the individual decision-making case: there is 
no reason to weight consequences linearly in probability rather than by some other weighting.  
And if this is right, then the idea that we need to use expected utility maximization in group 
decision-making has not yet been given a justification. 
 Thus, there are important differences between the Future Risk-Avoidance approach and 
other approaches in the literature on climate change policy.  Unlike the Maximin and 
Precautionary approaches, my approach recognizes that there might be significant costs of 
precautionary policies and that these could in principle be high enough to counterbalance the 
risks of serious climate change under industrious policies.  However, unlike the Expected Utility 
approach, my approach recognizes that these costs, because they are relatively less bad, need to 
be much, much higher in order to counterbalance the risks of industrious policies.  The Future 
Risk-Avoidance Principle is thus a well-justified principle that represents a middle option 
between the existing approaches. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this essay, I have argued that climate change policy must be very risk-avoidant: we 
must place a great deal of weight on the worst possible consequences.  We thus must be willing 
to incur high costs in order to make these consequences less likely.  I’ve argued that this holds 
because we must presume that individuals whose risk- attitudes we don’t know would only take 
risks all reasonable people would take.  And so we must presume this of future people, who 
make up a large portion of our group, and are significantly affected by the choice.  
I’ve offered an example to show how this conclusion might bear on climate change 
policy.  Our actual policy recommendations will depend heavily on the numbers involved, which 
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must be worked out by both scientists and ethicists, but the general lesson is that we ought to be 
willing to sacrifice a lot to ameliorate the risks of climate change—but not without limit.  This 
conclusion contrasts with two major principles in the decision theory literature: Expected Utility 
Maximization, which holds that we ought to sacrifice only in proportion to the probability of the 
risks; and Maximin, which holds that we ought to sacrifice without limit.  It also contrasts with 
the Precautionary Principle.  While my approach argues for some of the same practical 
conclusions as the Precautionary Principle, it avoids some of the problems plaguing that 
principle, and is part of a more general theory of rational and moral decision-making. 
Of course, there are a few questions that need to be answered in order to fully apply my 
analysis to climate change policy-making.  The first is how a group of the relevant sort ought to 
proceed when probabilities are imprecise or when the relevant individuals do not agree about the 
probabilities.  This does not mean we are totally in the dark about what to do in these cases.  On 
the approach here, we must care about relatively small probabilities of bad scenarios, and if all 
models or individuals agree that there is at least some threshold probability of a bad scenario, all 
models or individuals may recommend precautionary policies.  Furthermore, unless someone is 
prepared to argue that we should only use the most optimistic predictions, as long as the 
threshold probability is suggested by many of the models or individuals, we will have to adopt 
precautionary policies 
The second question is how to take different risk-attitudes into account if the situation is 
not so neat: if, for example, a policy has both potentially really wonderful consequences as well 
as potentially really terrible consequences, where the former accrue to present people and the 
latter to future people, and the present people are known to be relatively risk-inclined.  This will 
take us deeper into questions of distributive justice, and go beyond the simple scenario presented 
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here.  Still, this essay is a starting point in presenting a view about how to attribute risk-attitudes 
to the group whose preferences are unknown.  The third questions is what precisely characterizes 
the set of reasonable risk-preferences. 
The argument presented here reveals that how we ought to respond to climate change 
depends in large part on how we ought to attribute risk-attitudes to future people, and on how we 
ought to make group decisions when different individuals face different risks and have different 
preferences.  Even if one is not convinced by all of the steps in my argument, one can use its 
general form to frame the debate.  For example, one could argue that we should attribute risk-
attitudes to those with unknown preferences differently than the Risk Principle suggests.  Or, one 
could accept that risk-weighted expected utility maximization is the correct theory of rational 
decision-making—that there are a variety of attitudes one could adopt for individual decision-
making—but argue that there is a particular risk-attitude we should adopt for group decision-
making, independent of the attitudes of the individuals in the group; for example, that a group 
should always use the most risk-avoidant preferences within reason or that a group should 
always maximize expected utility.  Regardless of whether one agrees with my conclusions, it 
should be clear that the literature on climate change has not sufficiently addressed the fact that 
different people have different risk-attitudes and therefore might reasonably prefer different 
policies, and it is my hope that this essay goes some way towards bringing this fact into the 
debate.  
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